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TRANSMUTING THE POLITICO-LEGAL LUMP: BREXIT AND BRITAIN’S 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
Richard Mullender† 
“[N]othing beneath the sun ever will or can be firm.”1 
“[T]he British constitution . . . is the most flexible polity in existence.”2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Brexit (the process that will result in Britain leaving the European Union (E.U.)) creates an 
opportunity for the British to enjoy the benefits of their highly distinctive constitutional order. This 
order is a composite of three elements. Two of these elements (the legal and the political) are 
institutional and, unsurprisingly, the objects of close analysis. The third element is dispositional and 
finds expression in the effort to identify contingencies (most obviously, internal and external threats) 
that may disrupt the order’s operations or even compromise its viability. Those who cultivate this 
disposition embrace a virtue to which we can attach the label “vigilance.” This dispositional element 
of Britain’s constitutional order is less well understood than its legal and political components. 
However, it merits close attention since it goes a long way towards explaining British unease with the 
process of European integration. The thinking of those who have championed this process has given 
expression to the assumption that Europe, as a superstate-in-the-making, would have a legal (rather 
than politico-legal) constitution.3 Within such a constitutional context, a highest-order norm sustains a 
normative space that radiates down and out from it.4 Norms of this sort often give expression to a 
vision. This is certainly true of the E.U., where the supremacy of European Union law serves the end 
of “ever closer union” (between member-states) on a socially just model. 
Thinking along these lines is anything but alien to the British. The idea of a highest-order norm 
finds clear expression in Albert Venn Dicey’s account of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty.5 
Moreover, the view that law can be (indeed, is) the source of an attractive vision has gained currency 
in Britain in recent years. A body of jurisprudential thought, to which Martin Loughlin has given the 
name “liberal . . . normativism,” has encouraged this view.6 More particularly, liberal normativism has 
fed a process of development in Britain that we will explore under the heading “the rise of the legal 
constitution.” This process, along with European integration, threatens to turn Britain’s politico-legal 
order into a legal constitution on the model embraced by the E.U. With the aim of explaining why this 
 
 †  Professor of Law and Legal Theory, Newcastle Law School, Newcastle University, England. This Essay has grown out of the 
paper I gave at New York University’s School of Law in April 2017 (during the Symposium on Brexit: Origins and Prospects organized 
by Professor Richard Epstein and his colleagues in NYU’s Classical Liberal Institute). I am grateful to James Allen, T.T. Arvind, Tom 
Bennett, David Campbell, Richard Epstein, Daniel Francis, Jesus Hernandez-Villaverde, Martin Loughlin, Allan Meltzer, Patrick 
O’Callaghan, Maimon Schwarzschild, Warren Swain, James Upcher, and Joseph Weiler for their comments on earlier drafts of this 
Essay. 
 1 MAURIZIO VIROLI, MACHIAVELLI 18 (1998). 
 2 ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 91 (10th ed. 1961). 
 3 See JOHN GILLINGHAM, THE EU: AN OBITUARY 106 (2016). 
 4 See Martin Loughlin, The Constitutional Imagination, 78 MOD. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015). 
 5 DICEY, supra note 2, at ch. I. 
 6 MARTIN LOUGHLIN, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL THEORY 206 (1992). 
is the case, we will examine the recent Brexit-related case of Miller and another (Respondents) v. 
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant).7 Miller is, as we will see, part of the 
rise of the legal constitution. With the aim of gaining analytic purchase on this case and the process of 
which it is a part, we will draw on Stanley Fish’s essay, “Transmuting the Lump.”8 But before turning 
to these tasks, we will examine the development of Britain’s constitutional order. 
I.     BRITAIN’S CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: A BRIEF HISTORY 
The origins of Britain’s constitutional order are obscure and a source of controversy. However, 
we can trace the three features noted in the Introduction (law, politics, and attentiveness to contingency) 
back to King Alfred the Great’s reign in ninth century Wessex. Alfred was “the first of the kings [in 
the pre-Norman context] to set about combining the different law codes [then existing] . . . into a 
single, coherent whole . . . .”9 He also understood politics to be a process of interest accommodation. 
This became apparent when, for example, he established the “Danelaw”: an agreement to cede territory 
to Danish invaders who had beset Wessex and other parts of England in return for peace.10 These points 
give us grounds for describing Alfred’s approach to government as “politico-legal.” However, he was 
also highly attentive to the circumstances in which he wielded legal and political power. His resort to 
the Danelaw illustrates this point. Alfred grasped that the Danish threat to England was existential.11 
His response was to establish a modus vivendi (the Danelaw) that was an admixture of “stability as a 
balance of forces and stability for the right reasons.”12 The Danelaw promoted stability as a balance of 
forces by giving the English and the Danes reasons to refrain from the use of force. It also promoted 
stability for the right reasons by giving Alfred the opportunity to preserve and foster an English 
community into which he sought to induct the Danes. 
In Alfred’s approach to government, we can see the elements of an order that exhibits a low level 
of articulation. Law and politics (as a process of interest accommodation) are resources at the disposal 
of the sovereign rather than the components of a system that exhibits a high level of integration. 
However, the state as we now know it comes more clearly into focus as a result of the process of 
centralization and unification set in motion in the eleventh century by William of Normandy. During 
the centuries of Norman and then Plantagenet rule, the institutional scene became more complex. 
Magna Carta (1215) gave expression to the view that law should place constraints on the power of 
those who govern.13 With the development of the institution that acquires the name “Parliament,” we 
can see an intensifying commitment to politics as interest accommodation. In the common law, we 
find an institutional embodiment of the attentive outlook that featured in Alfred’s approach to 
government. For the judges and lawyers who developed the common law attended to contingency—in 
the form of the novel disputes to which they sought to find authoritative solutions.14 
When we turn to Tudor England (1485–1603), we find in Henry VII a monarch who was “legal-
minded in the extreme.”15 A “participatory political culture” was also a feature of the political context 
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in which he ruled.16 In this context, “[r]oyal authority became public authority inasmuch as it was 
deployed on behalf of and by an informed and articulate political community that existed alongside the 
monarch.”17 During Henry VIII’s reign, this became a context in which Thomas Cromwell (the King’s 
first minister) used his favored legal instrument, the statute, to give expression to England’s status as 
a sovereign state.18 Alongside these institutional developments, attentiveness to contingency remained 
a feature of the practical scene. It found expression in, for example, Thomas More’s Utopia. More 
argued that those who entertained “suspicion of tyranny” on the part of a ruler could legitimately 
remove him from power.19 “Suspicion” of the sort More describes has relevance to the descent into 
conflict that occurred in the seventeenth century. The Crown’s unwillingness to show respect for 
Parliament’s prerogatives and its resort to prerogative taxation bulk large among the causes of this 
conflict.20 The upshot was a crisis of interest accommodation. “The Glorious Revolution,” the 
constitutional settlement of 1688 (which followed the cataclysm of civil war, the Interregnum, and the 
Restoration), was a response to this problem. This settlement muted the tension that had issued in civil 
war by vesting sovereign power in the Crown-in-Parliament (a monarchical-cum-representative 
compromise). 
At this point in England’s history, a politico-legal framework that has endured ever since comes 
into existence. A highest-order norm, the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, establishes a 
normative space that radiates down and out from it. This space accommodates lower-order law (e.g., 
statutes) that derive their validity from the highest-order norm. Likewise it accommodates the common 
law—which judges can elaborate in ways that are compatible with the highest-order norm. However, 
we must not reduce this framework to an assemblage of legal norms. For it provided the context in 
which the democratic principle exerted increasing normative force. This force found expression in a 
succession of nineteenth and twentieth century statutes that ultimately delivered universal suffrage.21 
The arrival of universal suffrage was both a triumph of interest accommodation and a grave threat to 
it. For a government with a bare majority in the House of Commons could make or unmake any law 
(and invoke a democratic mandate in support of its actions).22 The threat posed to the interests of 
individuals by this state of affairs prompted Tony Blair’s New Labour government to weave human 
rights–related protections into British law in the 1990s. But while New Labour took this step, it put in 
place legislation (the Human Rights Act 1998) that made plain the doctrine of Parliamentary 
sovereignty’s highest-order status within the Britain’s politico-legal order.23 
Alongside the drive towards democracy that took place in nineteenth and twentieth century 
Britain, we must set another process that saw Britain become “a much governed nation.”24 Prior to the 
nineteenth century, law in Britain bore obvious resemblances to what Michael Oakeshott calls a civil 
association. By a civil association, Oakeshott means a modest-rule-governed framework.25 On his 
account, those who live in such a framework may engage in freely chosen activities with a minimum 
of frustration. The minimum to which Oakeshott refers is a readiness on the part of individuals to act 
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in accordance with “general rules of conduct” that sustain the framework.26 Oakeshott also argues that 
since the nineteenth century, civil association in Britain has lost ground to enterprise association. By 
“enterprise association,” he means a goal-focused and highly instrumental model of human 
association.27 He adds that this is a context in which the commitment to the individual apparent in a 
civil association is weaker.28 This is because those who wield power seek to co-opt all members of 
society into their plans. In the British context, these plans have been concerned with the pursuit of a 
distributively just end-state. This is the sort of end-state that British politicians have sought to make 
vivid in phrases such as “New Jerusalem” and the “welfare state.”29 
While enterprise association has gained prominence in Britain, it has not, on Oakeshott’s account, 
supplanted civil association.30 He adds that enterprise association in Britain occupies a position that is 
similar to that in other West European states such as France and Germany. Here we see a point of 
intersection between Britain and other member-states of the E.U. The commitment to enterprise 
association apparent in these states is also on display in the European Union. In the phrase “ever closer 
union,” the founders of the European Economic Community (EEC) made plain their determination to 
pursue an integrated end-state.31 Moreover, in its commitment to interest accommodation (e.g., through 
voting arrangements within the Council) and redistribution (e.g., the social fund), the ideal of 
distributive justice inflects the institutions and operations of the E.U. This is the ideal of justice 
according to which we should seek to fashion institutions that defensibly accommodate the interests of 
all relevant people.32 
While enterprise association on Britain’s welfarist model exhibits features that are similar to those 
that are apparent in France, Germany, and the E.U., it has a more revisable appearance. This reflects 
the continuing appeal of civil association, with its emphasis on the individual and its attractions for 
those who take a skeptical view of large governmental ambitions. Thus we might describe enterprise 
association and civil association as standing in a relationship of unstable equipoise in Britain. 
Moreover, we might find in this uneasy relationship intimations of the disposition we labelled 
attentiveness to contingency: e.g., recognition of the unsustainability of Britain’s post-war (social 
democratic) settlement in which a commitment to enterprise association bulked large.33 We might also 
see the same disposition as being at work in British skepticism towards the process of European 
integration. Certainly, it is not hard to find in Britain criticism of Europe running on the theme that 
pursuit of an ever closer union is blinding those who engage in it to practically significant 
contingencies.34 If this analysis is broadly correct, we might say that British vigilance or attentiveness 
to contingency stands in a relationship of tension with Continental vision.35 But alongside this point, 
we must set another that brings to light a point of intersection between British politico-legal life and 
the project of European integration. This point of intersection comes into view when we examine the 
rise of the legal constitution (and the vision that has informed this process). 
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II.     THE RISE OF THE LEGAL CONSTITUTION 
A.     The Legal Constitution and the Rule of Law 
Before we turn to the rise of the legal constitution, we must examine some historical background 
relevant to this process. In Britain, the idea of a legal constitution and, likewise, the ideal of the rule of 
law have deep roots in the country’s history. We find judges, legal academics, and historians making 
reference to an “ancient constitution” that predated the Norman invasion in the eleventh century. The 
idea of the ancient constitution occupied a prominent place in, for example, Sir Edward Coke’s critique 
of the absolutism of the Stuart monarchs in the seventeenth century.36 In the eighteenth century, 
commitment to the rule of law found powerful expression in, for example, Entick v. Carrington.37 In 
this case an official issued a warrant the purpose of which was to authorize a search for seditious 
papers. However, the official had no authority to issue the warrant. Consequently, the victim of the 
search was able to seek redress for the civil wrong of trespass. While rendering judgment, Lord 
Camden declared that: “[b]y the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so 
minute, is a trespass.”38 In the nineteenth century, Dicey found, in cases such as Entick, support for his 
account of the rule of law as it existed in Britain. According to Dicey, commitment to this ideal 
involved “the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary 
[l]aw [c]ourts . . . .”39 
The “ancient constitution” and the other expressions of commitment to the rule of law that we 
have considered share a common feature. This is the assumption that legal arguments proceed in a 
space within which there will be considerable clarity on what people (e.g., the official in Entick) can 
or cannot do. In such a space, social life has a reassuringly predictable appearance. Reassurance of this 
sort is something that the practice of judicial review (as judges have elaborated it in British public law) 
offers. When judges engage in this practice, their job is to determine whether the conduct of, for 
example, a government minister has a legal basis. This means that when such an official or a public 
body makes a decision that exhibits irrationality, illegality, or procedural impropriety, a court may 
quash it.40 While the practice of judicial review has been a feature of the British politico-legal order 
for centuries, it began to develop dramatically after World War II. This development marks the 
beginning of the rise of the legal constitution and liberal normativism. 
B.     Towards a New Constitutional Order? 
During the decades after World War II, judges showed greater willingness to invigilate official 
conduct. They were readier, for example, to identify errors of law on the face of the record (even when 
they were within jurisdiction).41 Likewise, they applied the rules of natural justice with greater rigor 
so as to enhance the level of procedural protection that those in dispute with government would enjoy.42 
Judges also began to fashion new doctrines that placed constraints on public bodies and officials: for 
example, the doctrine of legitimate expectations and the duty to give reasons.43 These developments 
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prompted some judges to entertain the possibility that a court might, at some point in the future, strike 
down primary legislation (and thus embrace the practice of constitutional judicial review).44 
Judicial readiness to entertain this possibility is a clear indication of the rise of the legal 
constitution. However, no judge has attempted to strike down primary legislation. While this is the 
case, the process we are considering has, if anything, intensified in recent years.45 Indeed, we might 
describe the developments to which we will now turn as its second wave. This wave has drawn strength 
from sources other than English law. Judges made their readiness to draw on such sources apparent 
when they invoked rights within the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) prior to Parliament giving domestic effect to these norms.46 This happened in, for 
example, defamation cases that concerned the extent of the protection that the law should give to free 
expression (which the qualified right in Article 10 of the ECHR protects).47 In cases such as these, 
judges and lawyers identified the human rights–related norms they invoked as means by which to 
establish a more defensible accommodation of interests within domestic law. 
A similar impulse was at work when lawyers canvassed the possibility that the proportionality 
principle should be (along with illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety) a ground of judicial 
review.48 The proportionality principle specifies that action in pursuit of socially beneficial ends should 
only override the significant interests of individuals where this is necessary.49 To weave this ground of 
review into domestic law is to erode the distinction between vires and merits in administrative law.50 
Thus its adoption as a generally applicable ground of judicial review would place a question mark over 
the status of Britain’s highest-order legal norm, Parliamentary sovereignty. Save in cases that involve 
ECHR rights, judges have continued to confine themselves to questions of illegality, irrationality, and 
procedural impropriety in judicial review proceedings. They have done this on the ground that these 
considerations have to do exclusively with questions of vires.51 To embrace the proportionality 
principle would be to stray into the territory of merits (and this would bring judges into collision with 
the sovereign legislature). 
While technical and typically rather dry, legal argument in the areas we have been examining 
gives expression to a vision that savors of liberal normativism.52 A feature of this vision is law as an 
institution that secures people’s interests and the rights that protect them. Law’s ability to do this finds 
emphatic expression in R (on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v. Secretary of State 
for Exiting the European Union (Appellant). 
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III.     R (ON THE APPLICATION OF MILLER AND ANOTHER) (RESPONDENTS) V. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 
EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION (APPELLANT) 
A.     Miller in Context 
Before we examine the Miller case in detail, we must set it in the context of Britain’s relationship 
with the E.U. Prior to and since accession to the EEC in 1973, British participation in the project of 
European integration has been a recurrent and sometimes acute source of controversy.53 In 1975, a 
referendum on the question as to whether Britain should remain in the EEC yielded a clear majority in 
favor of staying in Europe.54 However, criticism of the European project continued and grew more 
vociferous: e.g., Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech of 1988, and the critical onslaught against the 
Maastricht Treaty mounted by Conservative Eurosceptics in the early 1990s.55 In 2013 (and with the 
aim of bringing controversy on Europe to a halt), Britain’s Prime Minister, David Cameron, promised 
a second (in-out) referendum if the Conservative Party won the 2015 general election.56 The 
Conservatives were victorious and enacted the European Union Referendum Act 2015. The 
referendum took place in 2016. The result was a (51.9% as against 48.1%) majority in favor of leaving 
the E.U. 
Following the referendum result, Gina Miller (and a number of others) argued that the government 
could not use the Royal prerogative as a basis on which to give notice to leave the E.U. (under Article 
50(2) of the Lisbon Treaty).57 More particularly, Miller argued that she enjoyed rights within E.U. law 
that the government could only take away from her by enacting a statute that made it plain that this 
was its intention. These arguments won a positive response from the Divisional Court.58 The Court 
justified its decision by reference to, among other things, a doctrine that gained currency during the 
rise of the legal constitution. This is the constitutional statute doctrine, according to which some pieces 
of primary legislation have a higher-order status in Britain’s constitutional order. The Divisional Court 
identified the statute by means of which EEC law became effective in Britain, the European 
Communities Act 1972 (ECA), as such an act.59 On the Court’s analysis, the “major constitutional 
importance” of the ECA meant that “the usual doctrine of implied repeal by enactment of later 
inconsistent legislation” could not apply in the case before it.60 This meant that Parliament would have 
to use “especially clear” language if it wished to repeal the ECA and in this way deprive people of the 
rights it secures.61 
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B.     Miller in the Supreme Court 
The Government appealed this decision and continued to argue, before the Supreme Court, that 
the U.K.’s “constitutional arrangements” allowed ministers to use the prerogative as a basis on which 
to give notice under Article 50.62 For Miller, David Pannick QC responded by arguing that, if the 
government used the prerogative to give notice, the effect would be decisive. By “decisive” he meant 
that ministers would be “pulling . . . the trigger which causes the bullet to be fired, with the 
consequence that the bullet will hit the target and the Treaties will cease to apply.”63 Pannick added 
that this would mean that “some of the legal rights which the applicants enjoy under EU law will come 
to an end.”64 In light of these points, he concluded that giving notice on the basis that the government 
proposed would be “tantamount to altering the law by ministerial action.”65 Thus it would be contrary 
to the constitutional requirement that Parliament should use primary legislation to strip people of their 
legal rights. 
James Eadie QC responded to these submissions by arguing that “significant legal changes” did 
not preclude the government from relying on the prerogative when giving notice.66 More particularly, 
Eadie argued that the terms of the ECA had not excluded the prerogative power to give notice. In 
support of this point, he advanced an argument that contained three steps. First, “the 1972 Act gave 
effect to EU law only insofar as the EU treaties required it.”67 Secondly, the force of E.U. law in the 
municipal context was contingent on the U.K. remaining a party to the treaties.68 Thirdly, Parliament 
had, in the 1972 Act, effectively stipulated that E.U. law would cease to have effect domestically in 
circumstances where ministers decided to withdraw from the treaties.69 Alongside this argument, Eadie 
set the point that, while later statutes have imposed constraints on the exercise of E.U. treaty–related 
prerogative powers, they have not touched the power to withdraw from the Union.70 
By 8-3, the Supreme Court held that Parliament would have to legislate before ministers could 
trigger Article 50. Lord Neuberger and his colleagues in the majority pursued the theme that “[t]he EU 
treaties . . . implemented pursuant to the 1972 Act were and are unique in their legislative and 
constitutional implications.”71 In 1972, Parliament had, on the majority’s analysis, “grafted” a 
“dynamic, international source of law” onto “the well-established existing sources of domestic law.”72 
The majority added that many lawyers failed to grasp the “legal consequences” of this “unprecedented” 
development until the 1990s.73 But while the 1972 Act had created an unprecedented state of affairs, it 
had left the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty intact. Consequently, Parliament could repeal the 
1972 Act “like any other statute.”74 In light of the ECA’s unique character, the doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty, and the rights invoked by Miller, the majority held that there was “no 
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prerogative power to give [n]otice.”75 The majority also found support for its decision in “the principle 
of legality” and considerations of “constitutional propriety.”76 But while talking in these broad terms, 
the majority ultimately relied on “the rule” that ministers could not use Article 50 to “alter UK domestic 
law.”77 
In his dissenting judgment, Lord Reed presented a dramatically different account of relevant law. 
His starting point was that “the principle of Parliamentary supremacy . . . does not . . . require that 
Parliament must enact an Act of Parliament before the UK can leave the EU.”78 He took this view in 
light of the fact that “the effect which Parliament has given to EU law in our domestic law, under the 
1972 Act, is inherently conditional on the application of the EU treaties to the UK . . . .”79 Lord Reed 
added that “[t]he Act imposes no requirement, and manifests no intention, in respect of the UK’s 
membership of the EU.”80 These points prompted him to conclude that the Act “does not, therefore, 
affect the Crown’s exercise of prerogative powers in respect of UK membership.”81 In his response to 
the argument that the government would take away statutory rights by triggering Article 50, Lord Reed 
identified these entitlements as “inherently contingent.”82 By this he meant that these and other such 
rights will exist only for so long as the E.U. treaties have legal force in the U.K. 
More generally, Lord Reed echoed Lord Mance in Pham v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department on the point that “European law is certainly special and represents a remarkable 
development in the world’s legal history.”83 But Lord Reed drove home the point that accession to the 
EEC had not altered the status of Parliamentary sovereignty as Britain’s highest-order legal norm. 
Moreover, he stated that the primacy of E.U. law in the British context derives from the will of 
Parliament as it finds expression in the 1972 Act.84 Lord Reed was also at pains to point out that he 
saw no need “to consider the legal implications of the [2016] referendum” in his judgment.85 However, 
he did observe that “[i]t is important for courts to understand that the legalisation of political issues is 
not always constitutionally appropriate, and may be fraught with risk, not least for the judiciary.”86 
Lord Reed also commented critically on the use of case law by the majority and counsel for the 
applicants that did not, in his view, bear on the matters before the Court (e.g., the Case of 
Proclamations).87 These more general observations reveal greater sensitivity on Lord Reed’s part to 
the nature of Britain’s politico-legal order than is apparent in the response of the majority.88 However, 
Lord Reed’s reliance on legal grounds for his decision provides a basis on which to suggest that “the 
legal constitution” may be exerting considerable influence on judges and lawyers who are attuned to 
the politico-legal context in which they work. For Lord Reed, like his colleagues in the majority, 
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showed no inclination to identify the issues raised by Miller as nonjusticiable.89 
The failure of the Supreme Court majority, Lord Reed, and counsel in Miller to address the issue 
of nonjusticiability is unsurprising when we view it in the light of the rise of the legal constitution. But 
when we scrutinize this failure from a politico-legal position, it takes on a troubling appearance. So 
too does another aspect of Miller. James Eadie suggested that, when Parliament enacted the European 
Union Referendum Act 2015, it assumed that it would yield a “decisive” result.90 However, Eadie did 
not develop this point. His decision not to do so prompted the Supreme Court majority to describe him 
as having gone about his business “realistically.”91 The majority’s use of the adverb “realistically” 
merits close attention. We can draw out at least some of its import by reference to a further aspect of 
the majority’s decision. This is the distinction that Lord Neuberger and his colleagues draw between 
considerations with political “force” and those with legal “force.”92 In not developing his point vis-à-
vis the 2016 referendum result, Eadie had grasped that it had political rather than legal force. To draw 
on our earlier analysis, he had recognized that this political consideration would not, in the context of 
the legal constitution, exert normative force of a sort to which the Court would be responsive. This 
indicates the prominence that legal considerations now enjoy in Britain’s constitutional order. 
This prominence lends strong support to the claim that Britain has, in recent decades, witnessed 
the rise of the legal constitution. However, the political component in Britain’s constitutional order 
looms into view in Miller. Its unmistakable outlines are apparent in the result of the 2016 referendum 
and the commitment to democracy of which it is the expression. While the judges and lawyers who 
participated in Miller focus their attention on law, politics haunts the court room. This is anything but 
surprising in the context of a politico-legal order. The claims of politics have a reality rooted in the 
order’s history. Consider, once again, the issue of nonjusticiability, which the Supreme Court skirted 
in Miller. Had the justices of the Supreme Court opted to identify the issue raised in the case as 
nonjusticiable, they would have staked out a position that honored the democratic impulses at work in 
the British constitutional context. To contemplate this possibility is to experience a sense of 
“ontological flickering.”93 For the order’s political and legal dimensions open up two normative worlds 
(one legal and one political) that can, and, in Miller, did stand at some distance from one another. But 
each order has a reality that anyone alive to the order’s history will recognize. While this is the case, 
the rise of the legal constitution is a development we cannot ignore. We can sharpen our understanding 
of this development by drawing on Stanley Fish’s work. 
IV.     TRANSMUTING THE LUMP 
In “Transmuting the Lump,” Fish dwells on a shift, that unfolded over decades, in the way 
academics understood John Milton’s Paradise Lost. Fish notes that, in 1942, C.S. Lewis had described 
the last two of the twelve books that make up Paradise Lost as “an untransmuted lump” that lacked 
literary value and were an embarrassment to the poem.94 This assessment enjoyed widespread approval 
at the time (and became the center of gravity in Milton scholarship). Moreover, it encouraged the view 
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that there was no prospect of redeeming the two books. However, the commentators who embraced 
this view proved to be spectacularly wrong. This gives Fish his entrée. He traces a process (the 
transmutation of the lump) that resulted in books eleven and twelve becoming the “stabilizing and 
generating center” of Paradise Lost.95 Fish drives home the point that this process is incremental. It 
takes the form of a series of contributions to Milton scholarship. Fish also impresses on his readers the 
“narrative” character of this process: it is “sequential” and “discursive.”96 The elements in this narrative 
were, according to Fish, a sequence of “critical estimates” that acquired the character of a “project.”97 
Fish argues that the upshot of the process he describes is an understanding of Paradise Lost as “a 
spatial object everywhere infused with the same meaning.”98 This object, a “spatial block”, comes into 
existence because its “stabilizing . . . center” brings into being “a simultaneity of multiple views.”99 
By this Fish means that all parts in the block or space “radiate out from,” owe their significance to, 
and, hence, cohere with its center.100 In light of these points, he draws the conclusion that those who 
contemplate the block confront “a system of understanding” that “speaks [the] landscape and declares 
the shape of everything in it.”101 He also argues that this system of understanding prompts those who 
fall under its sway to turn away from “succession” in the form of the sequence of literary contributions 
that issued in the emergence of the block.102 Thus they lose sight of the fact that “literary works are the 
products as well as the objects of our activity . . . .”103 This seems surprising when viewed in light of 
the fact that the process Fish describes is not just a project but a reversal.104 However, when we 
recognize that the project of reversal that Fish describes has the purpose of establishing a new “reigning 
judgment,” the impulse to turn away from succession becomes easier to understand.105 To dwell on the 
process that has issued in a reigning judgment (a hard won achievement) is to alert those who dissent 
from it to the possibility that they could embark upon a new process of reversal. 
While Fish presents us with a fine-grained account of the process that issues in the transmutation 
of the lump he states that it is “nowhere announced as now beginning.”106 Rather, it begins as so much 
“grumbling” (in the form of none-too-focused expressions of discontent with the status quo) and 
acquires the character of a project in stages.107 In this feature of the literary scene, Fish finds support 
for the conclusion that, in literature as in practical life, “there is no final word . . . .”108 Instead, there 
are “only the words provoked by those intended as final.”109 Thus Fish presents us with a practice of 
interpretation that has no obvious stopping point—notwithstanding the efforts on the part of those 
pursuing particular projects to stake out not merely authoritative but also enduring positions. 
V.     TRANSMUTING THE POLITICO-LEGAL LUMP 
Fish’s account of the transmutation of the lump has applicability to Britain’s politico-legal order. 
As we noted earlier, this order is an institutional admixture of law and politics. In such a context, it 
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takes no great feat of imagination to contemplate the possibility that either law or politics could assume 
a dominant position within it. In such circumstances, the order’s other institutional component (be it 
law or politics) could take on a rather beleaguered appearance reminiscent of books Eleven and Twelve 
of Paradise Lost (when viewed in the light of Lewis’s reading). These points give us grounds for 
thinking that the rise of the legal constitution (as we examined it earlier) is analogous to the process 
Fish describes in “Transmuting the Lump.” For a particular understanding (“the legal constitution”) of 
the larger whole (“the politico-legal order”) has assumed a dominant position. On this view, law now 
“speaks [the] landscape and declares the shape of everything [significant] in it.”110 This is apparent in 
the Supreme Court’s response to the issues at stake in Miller. The judges in both the majority and the 
minority (and likewise counsel) treated only arguments with legal “force” as suitable grounds for 
decision. This explains, among other things, the absence from Lord Reed’s dissenting judgment of any 
consideration of the question as to whether the issue before the Court was nonjusticiable. 
While Fish’s account of the transmutation of the lump has applicability to the context we are 
considering, we need to proceed cautiously in our use of his thinking. As we noted earlier, the British 
politico-legal order comprises not just the institutional components of law and politics but also a 
dispositional element (attentiveness to contingency or vigilance). The order’s strong receptivity to 
contingency means that it does not have a fixed shape. Its shape alters as a result of the responsiveness 
of politicians and lawyers to contingencies. This is a point we can refine by recognizing that the order’s 
existing institutional commitments mediate the responses that politicians and lawyers make to the 
pressures that impinge upon the contexts in which they work. Thus when, for example, the need to 
prosecute a total war arises, this may prompt politicians to intensify existing commitments to enterprise 
association.111 Likewise, it may prompt judges to reduce the protection the law gives to individuals.112 
If this account of the British politico-legal order is broadly correct, it means that we are dealing 
with circumstances that are more complex than those that feature in Fish’s account of the transmutation 
of the lump. However, it does not follow from this fact that his analysis is of no assistance to us. But 
it is the case that we have to apply his insights in a context that is not stable. One way in which we can 
seek to do this is by offering an account of politicians and judges as possessing resources that equip 
them to respond to changing circumstances more or less aptly. In this context, “apt” relates to more 
than attentiveness to circumstances (a faculty we might capture in the figure of a weather eye). It also 
has to do with the fitness of law and politics as means to address the matters under scrutiny (and the 
readiness to engage in critical reflection on this subject). In making apt responses to the contingencies 
that confront them, politicians and judges play a part in creating what the French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu has called “a[n] [institutional] reality . . . that keeps coming into being.”113 Those who 
undertake tasks of this sort bear onerous burdens of judgment. Institutional history and the practical 
outlook it fosters are significant guides to action. A judge, for example, might consider (in light of 
earlier practice) whether he should treat an intensely controversial matter of political concern as 
justiciable. This task might also involve him in considering whether matters that embrace the interests 
of broad aggregates of people (and that may have a “many centered” character) are suitable for judicial 
resolution.114 
We can press this analysis further by bringing into the discussion the two epigrams that appear 
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below this essay’s title. Machiavelli tells us that “nothing beneath the sun ever will or can be firm.” 
Dicey declares that “the British constitution . . . is the most flexible polity in existence.” They each 
describe a reality that (to use Bourdieu’s phrase) “keeps coming into being.”115 Thus we might say that 
Britain’s politico-legal order is an institutional reality that keeps coming into being in response to a 
reality (an ever-changing world) that keeps coming into being. If our earlier analysis of vision as it 
features in the E.U. and liberal normativism is correct, they each promise a set of practical 
arrangements that may not be sufficiently sensitive to our ever-changing circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Law now occupies a more prominent position in Britain’s politico-legal order than was the case 
half-a-century ago. This is a development that reflects the rise of the legal constitution. The rise of the 
legal constitution is a process on which Stanley Fish’s “Transmuting the Lump” throws light. For the 
“critical estimates” on which Fish focuses his attention have an incremental effect that bears 
similarities to that wrought by the rise of the legal constitution. While this is the case, we must not 
lapse into overstatement. Fish tells us that the result of the process he describes is a new understanding 
of books Eleven and Twelve of Paradise Lost that “speaks [the] landscape and declares the shape of 
everything in it.” In Britain’s constitutional order, matters have not gone this far. While the judges of 
the Supreme Court and the barristers who argued before them in Miller thought it “realistic” not to 
dwell on political considerations, politics haunted the proceedings in which they participated—but not 
in the manner of Banquo’s ghost. For politics remains a component of Britain’s constitutional order. 
For this reason, we should classify the rise of the legal constitution in Britain as a process of 
intensification and not one of transformation. 
While commitment to the legal constitution has intensified, Britain’s constitutional order remains 
politico-legal. This became plain to see when its political component loomed into view during the 2016 
referendum campaign and its aftermath. In this Article we have probed the relationship between the 
order’s political and legal components by introducing the idea of “ontological flickering.” We owe this 
idea to a commentator on postmodern fiction (Brian McHale) who has used it to capture the sense of 
worlds that are insubstantial and that, consequently, flicker in and out of view. In the case of Britain’s 
constitutional order matters are different in ways that are worth noting before we close. Both law and 
politics, as they exist in Britain, present us with the stuff of normative worlds: spaces that are rich in 
practical significance. Moreover, they each make up elements in a history that is thick with detail 
(institutional and dispositional) and rich in moral appeal (an egalitarian philosophy of government that 
finds expression in law and politics). Clearly, the legal and political components of Britain’s 
constitutional order are anything but insubstantial. Thus we should not be surprised if they fade from 
view only to burst back into sight and make insistent claims—as in the political controversy that has 
attended Brexit and, more particularly, the 2016 referendum result. 
Finally, the emphasis on attentiveness to contingency in Britain’s constitutional order affords a 
basis on which to explain unease in the U.K. with the process of European integration. Attentiveness 
to contingency finds expression in a disposition that prompts those who cultivate it to keep a weather 
eye on sources (or potential sources) of practical difficulty. Critics of the E.U. have, for many years, 
found them in the fear that a long-lived form of (British) life is under threat. Likewise, they have found 
them in more particular concerns including inter alia, economic dislocation arising from European 
monetary union and the migration crisis of 2015.116 These considerations help explain why many 
Britons are chary of the vision that animates the advocates of European integration. Hence, we might 
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draw the conclusion that Brexit is a triumph of vigilance (or attentiveness to contingency) over vision. 
In a world where “nothing beneath the sun ever will or can be firm,”117 this may be to Britain’s 
advantage. 
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